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This paper looks at the development of the Unified Workers’ Central of Brazil (CUT) during the 
four consecutive Workers’ Party (PT) governments, first under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and later 
under Dilma Rousseff. The analysis draws on various aspects of the power resources approach, but 
focuses specifically on institutional power. The government found it politically difficult to implement 
a left-wing programme, due to the complex nature of the ruling coalition and its conservative 
opposition in the broader context of neo-liberal hegemony and financial globalisation. By continuing 
to establish dialogue with social movements, the PT governments stimulated forms of social 
participation in developing public policies, reinforcing existing institutions and creating new ones. By 
using its institutional power, the CUT was able to strengthen its participation in public institutions. 
There were hardly any substantial debates on labour or employment conducted without the CUT’s 
participation. On the other hand, the privileged spaces in the labour arena did not achieve structural 
changes capable of redefining the country’s development model and the standard of work regulation. 
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This paper looks at the development of the Unified Workers’ Central of Brazil (CUT)2 during the 
four consecutive Workers’ Party (PT) governments, from 2003 to 2016, first under Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva and later under Dilma Rousseff. The CUT is currently the main trade union federation in 
Brazil and Latin America, and the fifth largest in the world. In 2016 it had 3 800 affiliates with a 
membership of 7.8 million unionised workers out of a workforce of 24 million (CUT, 2016). 
Internationally, the CUT plays a prominent role in regional organisations such as the Trade Union 
Confederation of the Americas (TUCA), in global unions through its confederations, and in the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), whose current president was formerly president 
of the CUT. 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Patrícia Rocha Lemos and Ana Paula Colombi for their contribution to this article, 
as well as the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Brazil and Achim Wachendorfer for their helpful input. 
2 A list of abbreviations and acronyms appears at the end of this article for the reader’s convenience.  
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In theoretical and methodological terms, the authors use the categories of the power resources 
approach to analyse the evolution of the CUT during the PT governments. These categories – 
structural, associational, institutional and societal – are described in detail in the Introduction to this 
Special Issue (see also Wright, 2000; Silver, 2003). While the analysis will consider the interplay 
between the four different power resources, the main focus will be on changes that occurred 
specifically in institutional power. As “a secondary form of power”, institutional power is the result 
of previous struggles and negotiation processes based on structural power and associational power. 
In the Brazilian case, neo-liberal policies had been introduced during the 1990s, and these had a 
negative impact on workers. The CUT’s strategy for political change was based on being part of a 
larger political camp. Although the CUT had lost some of its structural and associational power due 
to the economic crisis, this strategy ultimately led to the strengthening of its associational and societal 
power through its link to the PT (associational power) and to wider social movements (societal 
power).  
The 2002 election of Lula as Brazilian president meant a political break with the past. The PT 
established itself as a political party that brought together an expressive part of the different urban, 
rural, social, trade union and environmental movements, expressing the demands of these social 
groups. But the PT entered the government through a broad ideological political coalition that 
brought together traditional sectors of politics and business segments. 
The political approach of the PT governments was designed to stimulate broad participation in 
elaborating public policies, reinforcing existing institutions and creating new ones. The intention was 
to seek support from social actors for the redefinition of policies that have historically been central in 
the trajectory of the PT. Such was also the demand of the organised social movements themselves, 
including trade unions and in particular the CUT, which had, since the 1990s, developed a strategy of 
occupying institutional spaces and negotiating issues affecting workers’ lives. 
However, the political difficulty of implementing a more left-wing programme soon became 
evident, due to the complex nature of the government coalition and its conservative opposition in 
the broader context of neo-liberal hegemony and financial globalisation. Therefore, with the prospect 
of continuing to establish dialogue with different social movements, the PT governments adopted 
the modus operandi of solving differences through social dialogue and searching for consensuses in 
institutional spaces. 
The election of Lula also generated high hopes among trade unionists that the focus would now 
be on creating jobs and promoting social inclusion based on a new development model for the 
country. The authors identified contradictory elements during this period. The nature of the relations 
between the CUT and the PT government changed during this period of almost a decade and a half, 
with distinct impacts on power resources and trade union strategy. The CUT had to find ways of 
handling its dual role of representing the workers’ interests and partaking in government, while 
facing criticism from conservative segments of society. It had to mediate between the “logic of 
membership” and the “logic of influence” (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999). That is, using institutions 
for one’s own ends while retaining political autonomy became crucial. Hence, the CUT lost some 
ground among trade unions and society in part due to its adoption of a more moderate political 
approach (Boito, Galvão and Marcelino, 2015). 
Factors such as the implementation of new social and economic policies, the close relationship 
between the CUT and the PT, and the progress achieved in collective bargaining and unionisation 
strengthened the CUT’s structural, associational and institutional power. With regard to its 
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institutional power, the CUT was able to strengthen its participation in relevant organisations and 
public institutions, most notably the Brazilian Economic and Social Development Council (CDES), 
whose mission was to define a development model for the country, and the tripartite National 
Labour Forum (FNT).  
Our main argument is that the significant advance of participation spaces was the result of the 
rise of the PT to power, which then sought consensual changes with the main social actors, especially 
in the productive sector (that is, the economy), but that the result was contradictory with regard to 
labour. On the one hand, the social dialogue processes have provided better living conditions for the 
population at the bottom of the social pyramid, especially from the point of view of employment, 
social protection and income. On the other hand, the privileged spaces in the labour arena did not 
achieve structural changes capable of redefining the country’s development model and the standard 
of work regulation. Advances were only made when there was consensus between capital and labour. 
After the impeachment of President Rousseff, these spaces were reconfigured in terms of 
composition and/or emptied from the point of view of content, especially those that are enshrined 
in the Federal Constitution. 
The study builds on previous research conducted by the authors (Krein, Dias and Colombi, 
2015; Krein and Dias, 2017). It also includes new quantitative data, documents produced by union 
centrals and recent literature. Formally the text is divided into six parts, besides the introduction: a 
brief historical contextualisation; the period from Lula’s inauguration as president in 2003 until the 
political crisis of 2005; Lula’s second mandate between 2006 and 2010; Dilma Rousseff’s first 
mandate from 2011 to 2014; the political crisis that led to the impeachment process in 2016; and 
closing remarks.  
 
 
History and Context: The Contradictions of Brazilian Corporatism 
Since the 1930s, the Brazilian trade union movement has been controlled by the state through a 
corporatist system. It has several elements. First, the principle of exclusivity only allows one local 
trade union in each municipality and bans factory-based trade unions. Second, it is characterised by a 
vertically organised system – confederation at national level, federation at state level, and trade 
unions for each economic sector and each profession; any kind of horizontal organisation was 
formally banned until 1986 and only officially legalised in 2008. Third, negotiation of collective 
bargaining agreements takes place between a trade union and a corresponding employers’ 
association. Fourth, a trade union organisation has to be legally recognised to be able to use its 
prerogative rights. Fifth, until 2017 there was guaranteed state funding via compulsory contributions, 
namely a trade union tax and a contribution to the confederation,3 as well as other duties linked to 
collective bargaining and membership fees. Lastly, decision-making power lies with local trade 
unions. 
This structure is marked by a high degree of ambivalence and flexibility. On the one hand, the 
state safeguards and controls the trade union system, which contributed to the founding of 
innumerable trade unions – more than 22 000 as of 2016, many of them without any 
representativeness, as the founding of a trade union depends merely on the fulfilment of legal 
                                                          
3 The Labour Law Reform of 2017 suffocated the two main sources of union funding by eliminating the trade 
union tax and restricting the collection of fees to union affiliates only. 
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requirements and not on the desire of the workers to be represented. On the other hand, Brazilian 
legislation grants a series of rights and prerogatives to trade unions in order to ensure their 
functioning. This includes certain protection rights for trade union leaders, guaranteed state funding, 
the (limited) right to strike, and the right to collective bargaining as a way of defining standards. 
Brazilian law further allows different trade union federations to coexist and to compete for local 
trade union affiliation. Therefore, the representation system is characterised by unicity at the base 
and pluralism at the top.  
Looking back in history, it is possible to find examples of diverging applications of the same 
laws, depending on the political regime in power. Between 1930 and 1980, the period in which the 
country was industrialised, Brazil experienced thirty-five years of authoritarian rule and fifteen years 
of democracy marked by a high level of instability. The authoritarian governments tried to intervene 
in order to impede unions from exercising their right to collective representation of the workers’ 
interests. During moments of democratisation, several official bodies played a decisive role in 
coordinating and planning activities and struggles in favour of single professional categories as well 
as in favour of the general workers’ interests in society. Between 1950 and 1964, the year of the 
military coup, and towards the end of the authoritarian regime in 1985, it was common practise 
among workers to establish horizontal structures of representation outside of the official structure.  
Despite a legal ban, the CUT was founded in 1983 amid the ongoing struggle for democracy in 
a country under military rule. It represents the “New Trade Unionism” that was and remains critical 
of the existing state-controlled trade union structures and is the result of the renewed relevance of 
the workers’ movement at the end of the 1970s. This movement has its roots within the more 
modern segments of the working class who believe in a new conception of trade unions grounded on 
conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO), such as freedom of association, and on 
more class-based and combative activities.  
Even with the CUT’s autonomy and the fact that it has affiliates from different left-wing 
political parties, the CUT and the PT share many common features, starting with the origin of both 
entities. The PT was founded in 1979 during the military regime, after the adoption of the law 
granting political amnesty. Its support base is very similar to the CUT’s, bringing together organised 
left-wing groups, militants of the left-wing Christian liberation theology movement, intellectuals and 
trade unionists. Its relationship with the CUT is historically close, similar to several workers’ 
movements across Europe. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a well-known trade unionist, was the first 
president of the Workers’ Party. 
The CUT gained pace within society by combining activities for economic improvements – 
campaigning for wage increases and for better working conditions – with the political struggle against 
the authoritarian regime and for democracy in Brazil. The latter involved intense striking, which 
proved to be a decisive instrument for a number of activities:  
 
a) reorganising trade unions by electing more active leaders who promoted democratisation;  
b) establishing new vertical structures for each industry, and for the CUT itself as a trade union 
federation;  
c) consolidating collective bargaining;  
d) giving trade union leaders the stage to gain a national reputation, including the future president 
Lula da Silva; and  
e) legitimising trade unions, which gained the reputation of being trustworthy organisations in 
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Brazilian society during the 1980s.  
 
Two other trade union centres were also founded during this time – the General Workers’ 
Trade Union Federation (CGT) in 1986,4 and the Union Force (FS) in 1991.5 
The 1990s had a negative impact on workers. Neo-liberal policies aimed at economic 
liberalisation, stabilising the currency and restructuring the productive sector caused a large increase 
in unemployment and informal employment. During this period, the CUT was weakened, mainly in 
terms of associational power (loss of membership) and structural power (unemployment and loss of 
rights). However, it adopted new campaign strategies, which focused more on: collective bargaining 
in the different economic sectors; activities at institutional level by formulating public policies and 
regulating labour relations; widening its agenda by addressing new issues in order to attract new 
segments of society; networking with other social movements in the fight against neo-liberal politics; 
and promoting positive political change, which would come through the election of Lula as Brazilian 
president.  
Regarding participation in institutions, the CUT moved from a contentious position that was 
common practice in the previous decade to adopt a strategy of “propositional resistance and dispute 
of hegemony in society”, as the union central stated in its strategy documents at the time. CUT 
started participating in a diversity of institutional spaces enshrined in the Federal Constitution of 
1988. This included playing a role in Councils of health, education, management of public resources 
of workers and public banks, among others. It also took part in newly created spaces, such as the 
Sectoral Chambers, meso-corporative institutions designed to formulate solutions to face the 
economic crisis of 1990–1992. According to a survey by Pochmann, Mendonça and Barreto (1998), 
by that time the trade union movement was present in more than forty spaces for definition of 
public policies. In the second half of the 1990s, the spaces of concertation were narrowed because 
the Federal Government of that time provided less funding for them. Even so, trade unions 
continued to invest energy in expanding their institutional participation by taking up space in 
Parliament and in the instances of participation guaranteed by the Constitution. 
The CUT’s strategy for political change was based on being part of a larger political camp. 
Although the CUT had lost some of its structural and associational power due to neo-liberal reform 
politics and economic crises, this strategy ultimately led to the strengthening of its associational and 
societal power through its links to the PT and to wider social movements respectively.  
 
 
2003–2006: From Lula’s Inauguration as President until the Political Crisis  
Lula’s election victory in October 2002 gave rise to hopes among most trade unionists that the neo-
liberal policies of the 1990s could be reversed. However, because there was an economic crisis, the 
start of this government’s tenure was conservative in many aspects, mainly regarding its economic 
                                                          
4. The CGT was established as a counterpart to the CUT and mainly aimed at defending the official trade 
union structure. Its affiliates range from traditional trade unions without links to political parties to the trade 
unions of the communist parties. 
5 Mounting tensions between the communist groups and more pragmatic approaches led to a split in the 
CGT. In 1990, the main communist tendency joined the CUT, while other groups established the FS in 1991. 
The FS defended an outcome-oriented trade union strategy, mainly concentrated within the private sector. 
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policies and the agenda for debate in Parliament, such as the reform of the social security system for 
public sector employees. At the same time, a range of policies against poverty were implemented, 
such as the programme Fome Zero (Zero Hunger).  
During this period, the CUT experienced an apparent paradox. On the one hand, due to its 
historical link to the political camp that supported Lula, it defended the government against attacks 
from conservative forces and criticism from the left, even though the CUT itself did not fully agree 
with the ongoing reforms and economic policies. It was precisely this lack of a clear position that 
caused two groups – CSP/CONLUTAS and the Intersindical6 – to leave the CUT. They were more 
to the political left and demanded a more critical attitude towards the government. On the other 
hand, the CUT managed to increase its institutional participation in the state through its membership 
of several councils and forums that defined and implemented public policies in Brazil (Araújo and 
Oliveira, 2011: 86).  
Due to the complex nature of the government coalition and the difficulty in implementing 
structural changes, Lula’s administration invested in the creation of negotiation spaces in the central 
themes of PT’s historical agenda. Mechanisms of social participation were expanded and organised 
society was invited to participate. Although not all of the general concerns of a significant part of 
society were vocalised, public policies in favour of land and rural reform, hunger eradication and 
groups in Brazilian society who faced discrimination – such as women, young people, the LGBT 
community and people of colour – found their way onto the political agenda. Strong opposition 
from more conservative sectors of national political life was a constant and the trade union 
movement, especially the CUT because of its proximity to the government, decided to participate 
intensely, being directly involved in the implementation of these polices. This further contributed to 
the strengthening of its institutional power.  
More and more trade unionists were also voted into Parliament. During 2003–2007, 69 out of 
513 MPs were trade unionists in leadership roles in their organisations.7 Networking with other social 
movements and cooperating with other trade union federations were decisive for the CUT’s societal 
power. The CUT is part of the Confederation of Social Movements (CMS) founded in 2003, which 
has among its members some of the main trade union organisations in the country, student 
associations, women’s associations, black civil rights organisations and land reform movements, 
among others.  
The economic recovery from 2004 onwards, which was initially fuelled by the commodity boom 
and later by a strong domestic market, came hand in hand with a political crisis in 2005. Facing 
attempts by the right to overthrow Lula’s presidency, the government approached trade unions and 
social movements for support. Following negotiations with the trade union federations, policies were 
adopted that helped to pave the way for socially inclusive economic growth. These policies included 
an increase in the minimum wage, an increase in social benefits (the Bolsa Familia programme), and 
                                                          
6 These two groups later split up into two different organisations. Both together made up 10 per cent of 
CUT’s affiliates. However, these organisations do not fulfil the legal criteria for official recognition as trade 
union centrals. 
7 More than twenty parties are represented in the Federal Parliament. Therefore, the government’s success in 
implementing its agenda depended heavily on its popularity and its ability to create alliances. This is even more 
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the creation of consigned credit schemes which facilitated workers’ access to credit (Baltar and 
Leone, 2016). These policy changes help explain the beginning of a dynamic of economic growth 
with social inclusion which characterised the PT governments. For instance, real wage increases 
through collective bargaining were obtained in the majority of professional categories from 2004 
onwards (DIEESE, 2015a). That and the increase of the minimum wage contributed to a reduction 
in income disparities and to an increase in purchasing power. Moreover, there was a significant 
reduction in unemployment and a growth in formal employment, which substantially increased the 
number of people protected by social security.  
However, from labour’s point of view, the results were contradictory. Changes in economic 
policy were not achieved and a conservative microeconomic agenda remained a factor of tension 
between the trade union movement and the government. That is, changes only came about when 
there was consensus among social actors (Colombi, 2018).  
In 2003, government created two important institutions in which trade unions had significant 
participation. The first was the Economic and Social Development Council, directly linked to the 
Presidency, with ministry status; its mission was to define a development model for the country. The 
second was the tripartite National Labour Forum that debated the reform of the trade union system 
and labour law. Although the CDES did not implement significant changes, it succeeded in bringing 
the union centrals closer to each other and to the government. However, the FNT was not able to 
reach consensus on the reforms. After more than three thousand hours of negotiations between 
trade unions and government, it was not possible to bring about a reform, as there was growing 
dissent; the proposal for a new system of trade union organisation and collective bargaining was not 
approved by Parliament.  
The 2003–2005 period was, therefore, a period that started with tensions and affiliates leaving 
the CUT, but also one that enhanced the CUT’s participation in the process of policy formulation 
with positive results for workers and the trade union movement under the hegemony of the CUT. 
Consequently, this period was marked by a strengthening of the federation’s structural, associational 
and societal power, as well as institutional power resulting from the establishment of new structures 
for participation.  
 
 
2006–2010: The Height of Lulaism8 
Between 2006 and 2010, the PT government changed its approach to development and the state. It 
took on a more prominent role in the economy by restructuring public services, requesting new 
tenders, making public employment more attractive, strengthening state-owned companies, and 
promoting socially inclusive economic growth. It was at this time that the main trade union 
federations joined the support base that was sustaining the government, with the exception of a few 
more left-wing groups. The institutional structures were maintained and policies to counteract the 
effects of the crisis were negotiated together. 
Faced with the global economic crisis in 2008, the government adopted policies to spur 
domestic demand via negotiations with the trade union federations. This led to economic growth. 
Together with policies to strengthen social inclusion through private consumption, this growth 
                                                          
8 “Lulaism” is a concept developed by Singer (2012) in order to show that Lula was gaining support among 
the non-organised segments of society due to his social policies.  
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brought very positive results – a decrease in unemployment and informal labour; increased income 
for workers, especially the less-qualified; a reduction in salary discrepancies; and an increase of the 
age at which young people start to work (Krein and Manzano, 2014).  
During the second term of office, the number of trade unionist MPs decreased from 69 to 55, 
but unionists continued to have an important voice in Parliament and occupied high offices in public 
bodies (D’Araujo, 2009). For example, the Ministry of Labour and Employment was handed over to 
the Union Force, the second-largest trade union central. This social dialogue and the participation of 
trade union leaders in public bodies strengthened the direct relationship between the government 
and the trade union movement.  
From 2006, the CUT’s strategy was based on two pillars: strengthening democracy and 
valorisation of work. Since the end of 2004, the CUT has organised the yearly Working-Class 
Marches, together with other trade union federations. While the first three marches mainly called for 
an increase in the minimum wage, the 2008 march put forward a new agenda. Two important 
documents were written: Workers’ Agenda for Development: With Income Distribution and Valorisation of 
Work (Centrais Sindicais, 2007) and Agenda for a National Development Project: With Sovereignty, Democracy 
and Valorisation of Work (Centrais Sindicais, 2010). Both documents demanded that the government 
take a more active role in promoting development and emphasised the benefit of an increase in the 
minimum wage and the creation of jobs for economic growth and development. During the 2008 
economic crisis the CUT maintained its strategy and supported the countercyclical policies adopted 
by the government, such as tax cuts in order to promote investments and consumer spending and to 
prevent mass redundancies. 
During this period, the CUT was an active member of the Labour Relations Council9 (CRT) and 
the Deliberative Council of the Workers’ Assistance Fund (CODEFAT) through which it 
participated in debates on labour and employment policies. The CUT was further involved in 
implementing policies for particularly vulnerable groups of society such as women, young people, the 
LGBT community and people of colour. 
Several elements contributed to a strengthening of the trade union movement’s resources of 
power. First, trade unions federations worked on improving networking and joint mobilisation 
activities such as the Working-Class Marches. Second, there was an increase in the absolute number 
of members, but a loss in density, as more jobs were created than workers were unionised (Alcantara 
e Silva, 2018). Third, the bill on official recognition of the trade union federations in 2008 was a 
positive factor. The CUT made concessions during those negotiations regarding its view of trade 
unionism, mainly concerning the compulsory contributions and the principle of exclusivity of 
representation.10 
Legal recognition of trade union federations contributed to a strengthening of the trade union 
federations’ associational and institutional power, even though it brought three undesired 
                                                          
9 The CRT was created in 2010, with a tripartite composition, after the demise of the National Labour Forum 
as part of the new legislation that recognised trade union federations. 
10 By law the trade union federations need to fulfil some criteria regarding representativeness to be officially 
recognised, such as distribution in the regions and within economic sectors and a representation of at least 7 
per cent of all trade union members. Official recognition meant that 10 per cent of the trade union tax 
revenue paid by every Brazilian worker was passed to the trade union federations. In 2008, this corresponded 
to approximately R$38 million, and in 2014 to nearly R$80 million of which the CUT receives one-third. [R$ 
is the currency abbreviation for the Brazilian Real.] 
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consequences. First, an increase in the fragmentation of the trade union movement was experienced 
on all levels as new trade union organisations were founded. The number of trade union federations 
rose to twelve, of which six are officially recognised.11 Second, there emerged an inability to agree on 
a reform of the trade union structure which would consolidate the fragmentation of the trade union 
system, where many entities exist but with little representativeness. Third, the emergence of a “trade 
union market”, where the trade union federations competed for new members as every new affiliate 
means an increase in revenue, hampered reform. This reinforced the contradictory trade union 
structure in Brazil.  
In short, the period between 2006 and 2010 was the height of Lulaism and of the relationship 
between the PT government and the trade union movement. After the political crisis of 2005, and in 
the midst of intense political debate in Brazilian society, the government sought to deepen its 
relationship with trade unionism, opening more space, often informal, to the trade union centrals 
under the leadership of the CUT. The result was that all formally recognised union centrals 
supported the PT’s candidature in the 2010 election.  
The balance of this period was also contradictory. Structural power increased, due to the growth 
in formal employment and in income, which were reflected in better living conditions for a large part 
of the population. At the same time, however, the trade union movement did not expand its 
associational power and lost legitimacy in society. The main reason was the steady withdrawal of the 
middle-wage sectors from the base of the PT. Regarding institutional power, there were no 
substantial changes to the model of development and labour relations. The legal recognition of trade 
union federations was the only part of the trade union reform that “survived”, generating mixed 
consequences which are discussed below. 
 
 
2011–2014: The Government of Dilma Rousseff 
The previous period was marked by decisive progress in terms of restructuring the labour market. 
Thus, Lula’s candidate, Dilma Rousseff, was elected president despite furious rhetoric against her 
among the middle and upper-income classes. They were opposed to policies that promoted social 
inclusion, to corruption, to their loss of social status, and to public services incapable of attending to 
the growing masses of people consuming, travelling and using those services. 
During this period, the economy began to slow. While the economy had grown 7.6 per cent in 
2010, by 2014 the growth rate was zero. There were several causes of the economic downturn. These 
included the ongoing international crisis and the fact that the expansion of domestic consumption 
was nearing its limits. Also contributing to the situation was the government’s inability to implement 
a development project, and several important initiatives not being successful either due to mistakes 
made during their implementation or to strong opposition from the economic elite of the country. A 
                                                          
11 In 2007 the class-based Union Current left the CUT and founded the Brazilian Workers’ Trade Union 
Federation (CTB), which later received official recognition. Today’s officially recognised trade union centres 
are the CUT, the FS, the CTB, the General Workers’ Union (UGT), the New Workers’ Union Central 
(NCST) and the Central Brazilian Union (CSB). The ones not officially recognised are: the Central of Trade 
Unions and Popular Movements (CSP/CONLUTAS), the Brazilian Democratic Workers’ Central (CBDT), 
the Unified Central of Public Servants of Brazil (CSPB), the Intersindical/Working-Class Central and 
Intersindical/Instrument of the Working-Class’s Struggle. 
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final contributor was incorrect interpretation of the current context and economic policy mistakes, 
especially concerning exchange rate policy. The economic problems were used by the big media 
corporations and opposition groups to wear down the government.  
In spite of the economic slowdown, labour market indicators were still improving. 
Unemployment sank to its lowest level by the end of 2014 (4.8 per cent), less the half of what it was 
when the PT took over in 2003. Wages continued to grow above inflation thanks to an increase in 
the minimum wage and positive collective bargaining results. Even increases in variable pay, such as 
profit-sharing schemes, were achieved. This shows how efficiently the trade unions managed to 
increase workers’ purchasing power, especially in low-income groups of society. The formal 
employment sector was also still growing. This improvement of indicators cannot be explained 
merely by the dynamic of the economy, but rather by other factors such as demographic change, 
higher household income, the state’s policies of social inclusion and the fight against illegality.  
During this period the relationship between Rousseff’s government and the trade union 
movement started to show signs of wear. The number of trade unionist MPs again increased to 64, 
the majority belonging to the CUT. Some of the highest governmental offices were occupied by 
trade unionists during this government. The institutional structures for dialogue and cooperation still 
existed and meetings were held. However, the interaction between the social actors and the 
government became more intricate, which impeded the building of a consensus around a common 
agenda. At the same time, the difficulties the country was experiencing highlighted the different 
understanding of how the economic problems should be solved and of how social inclusion policies 
should be implemented.  
The government attempted to adopt some ambitious measures, mainly in 2012 – namely 
reduction of interest rates, strengthening of public banks and exchange depreciation. The aim was to 
reduce profit from speculation and to stimulate productive investments. However, these actions led 
to growing discontent, especially in the financial market and among the big media corporations. 
Moreover, the poor quality of public services, the rise in inflation (albeit short) and investigations 
into corruption cases, mainly in the more developed regions of the country, contributed further to 
the discontent.  
Policies to return to a development agenda were adopted unilaterally by the government. For 
example, the policy of tax incentives for companies, which weakened the social security system, was 
not negotiated with trade union centrals. At this time, the CUT, while belonging to the same political 
camp, started to criticise the government for its lack of dialogue and for its economic policy. Even 
though the government met some of the CUT demands, the dialogue between the CUT and the 
government became more strained, increasingly giving way to more explicit criticism.  
With regard to labour regulations, the record of governmental policies shows that there are 
contradictory elements. Some measures increased protection (increases in minimum wage, the 
strengthening of domestic workers’ rights and the promotion of gender equality), while others 
increased flexibility (social security reform). However, some demands made by the trade union 
federations were not taken into consideration, such as a reduction of working hours, the introduction 
of a mechanism preventing unjustified dismissals and a more inclusive social security system (Krein 
and Biavaschi, 2015). 
The topic that was most visible was the one on easing labour law, including permission to 
subcontract workers and the prevalence of negotiated terms over legislation. This had been a 
demand of the private sector in the 1990s. The government, through the Labour Relations Council, 
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tried to negotiate an agenda of flexibilisation. The CUT played an important role in preventing the 
passing of some of the demands of the private sector into law, dominating the resistance against 
legalising the indiscriminate subcontracting of workers. There was no major agreement, and 
institutional spaces, although they remained in place, were emptied. As the negotiation space 
narrowed, the relation of attrition deepened. In short, neither employers nor workers saw their 
agenda being taken up by the government.  
Regarding the CUT’s internal structure, progress was made in attracting segments of society that 
had hardly been represented before and in broadening its agenda. The debate about these topics had 
started in the 1990s. However, it was only in the first decade of the new millennium that the new 
issues were institutionalised within the CUT’s organisational structure with the establishment of the 
Secretariat of Working Women (2003), the Secretariat of the Fight Against Racism (2009), the 
Secretariat of the Environment (2009) and the Secretariat of Young People (2009). As for gender 
equality, the 11th CUT congress in 2012 voted for equal representation of women and men at all 
leadership levels of the federation. Also worthy of mention is the establishment of the Agency for 
Solidary Development (1999), which promotes the management of companies by the workers 
themselves as well as alternative forms of work and income generation. In 2012, the CUT founded 
the Cooperation Institute. From being a mere beneficiary of international solidarity, the CUT started 
to develop a more systematic approach to international cooperation.  
From 2013 onwards, important changes affected society and politics. Since 2008, there had been 
an increase in labour conflicts, in a context of greater difficulty in advancing the negotiations due to 
the slowdown in economic growth and higher inflation. Despite the growing number of strikes and 
other industrial action, the main mobilisations during the period were not carried out by trade 
unionism, even being challenged in some cases. Such challenges took place during the 
demonstrations of 2011 in the great works of the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), the 
demonstrations of June 2013, and in several strikes in 2014 (urban waste collection workers in Rio de 
Janeiro and bus drivers in Porto Alegre) (DIEESE, 2015b; Braga, 2017). 
The demonstrations in June 2013 mobilised the masses, initially demanding a reduction of 
public transport rates and protesting against public spending for the 2014 World Cup. On the one 
hand, more and more people joined these protests, particularly young people who belonged neither 
to trade unions nor to political parties. There were progressive groups that pointed out the limits to 
the strategy of social inclusion by means of private consumption instead of by fully safeguarding 
citizenship rights. On the other hand, these protests were taken over by conservative groups, with 
the support of the big media corporations, that aimed at preserving the status quo for the middle and 
upper-income classes, as they benefited from inequality. They protested against social inclusion 
policies, such as the Bolsa Familia programme, the minimum wage and the affirmative action law with 
racial quotas at universities.  
Some social movements, such as the Homeless Workers’ Movement (MTST), gained strength 
during this period, but it was mainly the Right that benefited and that found a common enemy and 
scapegoat for the problems of society: they blamed the “reds”. The CUT maintained its associational 
and institutional power, but this new situation put pressure on its structural and societal power. The 
trade union movement was not welcome at these protests. There are countless reports of aggression 
against bearers of the red flags of left-wing parties and the CUT. At the height of the protests in July, 
the trade union federations organised marches in order to bring their demands back to the country’s 
agenda. The demonstrations were smaller in size than the counter-protests, but they drew attention 
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to the workers’ agenda. The CUT’s lack of leadership in the 2013 protests seems to be reflected in 
the trustworthiness index, which fell to its lowest level in that year, even though it was a record year 
of strikes.  
During this period the economic prospects became more difficult and the position of the trade 
union actors also more divided. In addition, the flexibilisation agenda was taken forcefully. For 
example, in the National Congress, of the fifty-five major legislative initiatives threatening workers’ 
rights, thirty-two were submitted or resubmitted after 2013 (Krein et al., 2017). The CUT, despite a 
more worn relationship and a greater distance from the Rousseff government, nevertheless adopted 
as strategy the defence of its re-election with the objective of avoiding the return of the Right to 
power in the 2014 election. 
 
 
2015: The Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff 
Notwithstanding a growing political polarisation and the strengthening of the Right, civil society 
organisations were mobilised in large numbers by campaigns, which the CUT participated in, to work 
for Rousseff’s re-election in 2014. The growing polarisation also reflected itself within the union 
system, where divisions were increasingly visible. While in 2010 all the official trade union 
federations supported Rousseff’s election, by 2014 it was only the CUT that did so. The other trade 
union federations were incapable of agreeing on one candidate due to internal divisions, and the FS, 
the second largest federation, predominantly supported the opposition.  
This was the moment when the economic indicators started to deteriorate, exacerbated by the 
government’s change of course towards a conservative austerity agenda which included restrictions 
to access to unemployment benefits and to minimum wage bonus schemes and a sharp rise in prices, 
particularly of petrol and energy. Moreover, and as a consequence of growing polarisation, the 
conservative forces clearly won the Congress elections in 2014. A liberal agenda was introduced and 
any attempt by the government to pass legislation was blocked. Growing unemployment, inflation, 
austerity measures, the weakening of its grassroots support base, the tactic of blocking government 
policies, and a strengthening of the Right further exacerbated the economic, political and social crisis 
and played an important role in the lead-up to the impeachment process. Moreover, the Right is 
highly represented in Brazilian public institutions – especially in the judiciary – and the media 
landscape is dominated by five big corporations that strongly supported the coup. 
Seeing that support for the institutional coup was growing, the government assumed a 
conservative and liberal agenda. This included privatisation of state-owned companies, weakening of 
public banks, cuts in social benefits with freezing of public spending for twenty years, restrictions on 
workers’ rights, permission to sell land to foreign companies, and increasingly opening the market to 
international companies for oil production. 
During the impeachment process, institutional spaces of negotiation almost disappeared as the 
dispute over the general course of the country intensified. A considerable number of trade union 
organisations joined the fight for democracy, but with the exception of the CUT and the CTB all of 
the trade union federations had to deal with internal divisions. Several other social and more left-
wing trade union organisations joined the movement, which did not, however, support the Workers’ 
Party. Thus, the fight for democracy brought the CUT and social movements closer together again, 
which temporarily strengthened the CUT’s societal power. At the same time, the CUT lost some 
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support amongst its affiliates, especially among more qualified workers with higher incomes. This 
latter group was more inclined to support the institutional coup, hoping that political change would 
end the economic crisis that has affected Brazil since the end of 2014 – a hope fuelled by the press, 
but never fulfilled. 
The CUT was one of the main actors in the coordination of the demonstrations against the 
institutional coup and decisive in organising the protests. The CUT participated in the Brazilian 
Popular Front movement and in the People Without Fear movement, two alliances that played an 
important role in the protests in defence of democracy and social rights in 2015 and 2016. Most 
notably, in 2015 important protests were organised by the trade union movement against a draft bill 
that aimed to fully liberalise the subcontracting of workers. Strong mobilisations postponed its 
approval to 2017. Over weeks and months, demonstrations in defence of democracy and social 
rights increased significantly, though they still did not bring together as many people as the protests 
organised by the Right. 
After the illegitimate government took power on 12 May 2016, it initially tried to seek support 
from part of the trade union movement. Soon, however, it aborted any negotiation with the unions, 
assuming in full the bosses’ agenda in the economic field, social protection and labour rights. The 
trade union federations split into two blocks: four of them (FS, NCST, CSB and UGT) decided to 
negotiate with the government, whereas the other two (CUT and CTB) together with another two 
other left-wing (and not officially recognised) trade union federations decided not to recognise the 
new government. The Economic and Social Development Council itself was redesigned, with the 
participation of workers reduced to less than 5 per cent of its members. The CUT and other trade 
union centrists critical of the coup were expelled from the CDES.  
Within this context, the CUT assumed a position of resistance against the government’s plans to 
reform labour law and the social security system. This resistance occurs in a difficult context. On the 
one hand, CUT’s social and associative power has been weakened, because it cannot mobilise part of 
its base in defence of democracy and social rights. On the other hand, it also loses institutional 
power because its position of non-recognition of the institutional coup means that it can no longer 
be the interlocutor of labour demands with the new government. Thus it has been isolated by the 




Over the last decade, the CUT has contributed to the shaping of alternative governmental politics. 
The election of a trade union leader as Brazilian president brought both advantages and 
disadvantages. The CUT became an indirect part of the coalition in power. This was a complex 
relationship, with trade unionists taking up political posts and the CUT supporting them publicly. 
The strong link with the government also meant that, at least during the times in which the 
government was popular (the greatest part of the period analysed), the CUT grew stronger. 
However, it also meant that its image suffered during moments of crisis, as in 2005 and after the 
protests in June 2013. Although the proximity between PT and CUT remained very strong, the CUT 
always sought to maintain its autonomy by putting pressure on the party to defend its demands in 
the National Congress, by organising demonstrations and making demands to improve workers’ 
living conditions.  
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The CUT’s associational and structural power increased during the four governments, due to 
the period of unprecedented socially inclusive economic growth. This was apparent in several ways. 
First, the CUT continued to be the main union federation (36 per cent in 2015), despite other trade 
union federations such as UGT and CTB gaining relative importance. Second, legislation was passed 
that officially recognised the union federations and guaranteed their funding. Third, the membership 
of trade unions increased by 4.5 million, although the number of new jobs created increased by 21 
million (Alcantara e Silva, 2018). Fourth, the unions were able to organise strikes, which rose in 
numbers until 2016 (DIEESE, 2015b, 2017). Fifth, real wage increases were achieved in collective 
bargaining. Sixth, the establishment of the new Secretariats for women, youth and anti-racism shows 
that new topics were embraced and considered a priority.  
With regard to its institutional power, the CUT was able to strengthen and to increase its 
participation in public institutions. It took part in more than 140 forums where public policies were 
debated and formulated. Furthermore, there were hardly any substantial debates on labour or 
employment conducted without the CUT’s participation. On the other hand, the privileged spaces in 
the labour arena did not achieve structural changes capable of redefining the country’s development 
model and the standard of work regulation. Advances were only made when there was a consensus 
between capital and labour. The most substantive result is the fact that there was no deconstruction 
of workers’ rights as sought by the neo-liberal project. 
In PT governments, the institutional power of workers was strengthened, despite the 
contradictions and limits of a modus operandi of institutional consensus. After the impeachment of 
President Rousseff, formal institutionality was maintained, but these spaces were either reconfigured 
in terms of composition – applying the principle of selectivity, including supporters and excluding 
critics –or emptied of content, especially those that are enshrined in the Federal Constitution.  
 The CUT’s experience reveals how essential it is, despite progress in institutional terms, not 
to neglect other power resources. Institutional power, even if backed by legislation, can only be 
enacted if there is commitment from other social actors, particularly the state. The influence that 
trade unionism can have in these arrangements depends heavily on the ability to draw from primary 
sources of power – structural and associational. The closeness between the CUT and the PT 
governments at first gave the CUT more institutional power, but also made it vulnerable to attrition 
with the fall of popularity of the Rousseff government and with the mobilisations against the 
impeachment. Currently there are several challenges – regaining representativeness, mobilising its 
traditional base of support and building alliances. The CUT must improve its framing capacity in 
order to strengthen its position in the political debate on the country’s direction in a context of 
labour market destructuring and of a strong offensive against workers (Melleiro and Steinhilber, 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
CBDT   Brazilian Democratic Workers’ Central [Central Brasileira Democrática dos 
Trabalhadores] 
CDES   Economic and Social Development Council [Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico e Social] 
CESIT   Centre for Studies in Trade Unions and Labour Economics [Centro de Estudos 
Sindicais e Economia do Trabalho] 
CGT   General Workers’ Trade Union Federation [Central Geral dos Trabalhadores’ 
CMS   Confederation of Social Movements [Coordenação dos Movimentos Sociais] 
CODEFAT   Deliberative Council of the Workers’ Assurance Fund [Conselho Deliberativo do 
Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador] 
CRT   Labour Relations Council [Conselho de Relações do Trabalho 
CSB   Central Brazilian Union [Central dos Sindicatos Brasileiros] 
CSP/CONLUTAS  Central of Trade Unions and Popular Movements [Central Sindical e 
Popular/CONLUTAS] 
CSPB   Unified Central of Public Servants of Brazil [Confederação dos Servidores Públicos 
do Brasil] 
CTB   Brazilian Workers Trade Union Federation [Central dos Trabalhadores e 
Trabalhadoras do Brasil] 
CUT   Unified Workers’ Central of Brazil [Central Única dos Trabalhadores] 
FNT   National Labour Forum [Fórum Nacional do Trabalho] 
FS   Union Force [Força Sindical] 
ITUC   International Trade Union Confederation  
LGBT   Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender  
MTST   Homeless Workers’ Movement [Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto] 
NCST   New Workers’ Union Central [Nova Central Sindical dos Trabalhadores] 
PAC   Growth Acceleration Programme [Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento] 
PT   Workers’ Party [Partido dos Trabalhadores] 
TUCA   Trade Union Confederation of the Americas 
UGT   General Workers’ Union [União Geral de Trabalhadores] 
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